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1 Introduction
Empirical work on firm diversification has often been interpreted as supporting the view
that conglomerates are inefficient. Findings such as the fact that conglomerates trade at
a discount, relative to a portfolio of comparable stand-alone firms, have led researchers to
believe that diversification destroys value.1 Popular explanations for this “diversification
discount” have generally emphasized the agency and behavioral problems associated with
the existence of conglomerates.2 Unfortunately, this view of diversification creates at least
two difficulties for researchers. First, while addressing the effects of diversification on
performance, agency models often fail to answer the more fundamental economic question
of why diversified firms exist at all, as diversification is often ex-ante inefficient. Second, the
empirical predictions of these agency-based models are usually very hard to quantify and
thus quite difficult to test. As a consequence, direct evidence supporting this agency view
is quite limited. Instead, support typically comes from the perceived failures of competing
theories.
In this paper we show that the main empirical regularities about firm diversification
are broadly consistent with the neoclassical view of efficient firm diversification. In our
model, firms diversify for two reasons. First, diversification allows firms to take advantage
of economies of scope by eliminating redundancies across different activities and lowering
fixed costs of production. Second, diversification allows a mature, slow growing, firm to
explore attractive new productive opportunities. We formalize this concept by assuming that
production activities exhibit decreasing returns to scale. As scale grows, returns decrease,
eventually leading the firm to search for profit opportunities in new activities.
In contrast to standard agency arguments, the structure of our model provides a natural
environment to investigate quantitatively the role of firm diversification on performance.
Since the model generates an artificial cross-sectional distribution of firms, we are able to
directly compare our results with the available empirical evidence.
1See Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988), Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Rajan, Servaes,
and Zingales (2000), Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2001), Whited (2001), Lamont and Polk (2001, 2002),
and Campa and Kedia (2002) among others.
2See Jensen (1986), Amihud and Levy (1981), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1989),
and Stulz (1990), Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997), and Scharfestein and Stein (2000) among others.
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We have two main sets of findings. First, the model predicts that diversified firms have,
on average, a lower value of Tobin’s Q than focused firms, as documented by Lang and
Stulz (1994). This happens despite the fact that diversification is optimal and there is no
source of inefficiency in our model. The intuition, however, is simple. In our model, firms
diversify only when they become relatively unproductive in their current activities. It is this
endogenous selection mechanism that accounts for the lower valuation of diversified firms.
Second, because our model explicitly links productivity with corporate diversification, we can
also address recent evidence on the effects of diversification on productivity (Schoar (2002)).
We find that, just as in the data, our model predicts that firms following diversification
strategies also experience empirically plausible productivity losses.
This emphasis on the importance of firm selection in accounting for the performance of
conglomerates effectively presents a theoretical foundation for the recent empirical findings
by Chevalier (2001), Villalonga (2001), Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002), and Campa and
Kedia (2002). Although their exact sources and methodologies differ, all of these papers are
part of a growing empirical literature suggesting that sample selection accounts for most, if
not all, of the ex-post differences between conglomerates and specialized firms.
More broadly, our work is also part of a recent strand of literature that emphasizes
a neoclassical view of optimal resource allocation in determining the observed pattern of
diversification. For example, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) show that the allocation
of resources within conglomerates is related to productivity in the different segments.
Matsusaka (2001) models diversification as an intermediate, and less productive, stage in
a search process over industries that best match the firm’s organizational capabilities. When
the perfect match is found, a firm eventually specializes. Finally, Bernardo and Chowdhry
(2002) explain the diversification discount by assuming that specialized firms have growth
options allowing them to diversify in the future. Because conglomerates are firms who have
exercised these options they are less valuable to investors.
While our dynamic environment incorporates features from each of these models, our
analysis differs in two crucial ways. First, while these papers are focused on a single issue, our
approach provides a unified and consistent explanation for much of the empirical evidence by
endogenously linking productivity, size, and valuations to diversification strategies. Second,
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instead of assuming that diversification is ex-ante less valuable, our model is able to
endogenously generate a diversification discount, an explanation that seems consistent with
recent empirical evidence.
Finally, our work also offers a useful framework to study the natural boundaries of the
firm in the context of a neoclassical environment. While our model is silent about the exact
micro-foundations for the interactions between (and within) firms (for example, internal
capital markets, incomplete contracts, and power relationships within contracts), it provides
something of a reduced form approach that is well suited for detailed empirical study, a
serious difficulty in this field of research.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the basic economic
environment and discusses our main assumptions. Section 3 provides a quantitative
evaluation of our model and establishes its main empirical implications. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
The economy consists of 2 sectors: households and firms. The core of the analysis is
our description of the production sector, where a large number of firms is engaged in the
production of the consumption good. The role of households is limited and summarized by
a single representative household making optimal consumption and portfolio decisions.
2.1 Firms
The production side of the economy consists of a large number of firms and two separate
industries or sectors. While the model can be augmented to include more sectors, this would
make the analysis unnecessarily complicated. Empirically, the effects of diversification on
performance are most notable when firms first expand from one to two segments, with
additional expansions having only marginal effects on performance (Lang and Stulz (1994)).
2.1.1 Description
We assume that time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. In each time period t, a firm
can either be focused in sector st = 1, 2 or operate in both sectors simultaneously, in which
case we will say that a firm is diversified and set st = 1 + 2 = 3. We assume that sectoral
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mobility is costly so that specialized firms cannot simply move all resources from sector 1 to
sector 2 (say). Formally, we assume that:
st ∈
{ {st−1, 3}, st−1 = 1, 2
{1, 2, 3}, st−1 = 3 (1)
In other words, a firm that has previously been focused in sector s can only choose to remain
in sector s (st = st−1), or to expand to both sectors (st = 3). Diversified firms, however,
face no restrictions: they can either remain diversified, or they can contract and focus on
just one industry. This costly mobility ensures that a firm must diversify before focusing on
entirely new activities, a pattern that is consistent with the data.3
The outcome of production in sector s, during period t, is the final good yst . For simplicity,
we assume that the goods are perfect substitutes so that the relative price between y1t and y
2
t
is always equal to 1. Production in either sector requires two inputs: capital or productive
capacity, kt, and labor, lt, and is subject to a technology shock z
s
t . Labor is hired at the
competitive wage rate Wt > 0, but capacity is owned by the firm. Production possibilities
for an individual firm operating in sector s are described by a Cobb-Douglas production
function:
yst = e
zst kαkt l
αl
t , 0 < αk + αl < 1, (2)
where αk and αl are the output elasticities of capital and labor, respectively. The restrictions
on these coefficients guarantee that production in each sector exhibits decreasing returns to
scale, so that returns fall as the firm grows.
Productivity levels are firm specific and cannot be traded. We assume that productivity
in each sector s follows a simple AR(1) process
zst = ρz
s
t−1 + ε
s
t , (3)
where each εst is a normal random variables with mean zero and variance σ
2. For simplicity
we also assume that there is no cross-correlation between the shocks in the two sectors. To
save on notation we also define the productivity vector zt = (z
1
t , z
2
t ).
Finally, total firm capacity is described by the law-of-motion
kt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + it, (4)
3This assumption seems plausible but it is not crucial. It will, however, make it easier to construct Figure
2 below and to gain some intuition about our results.
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where it denotes gross investment spending, and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. Thus,
new investment, it, becomes productive only at the beginning of the next period.
The timing of the decisions is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Timing of Events
t t+1


Firm arrives with
(st−1, kt, zt−1)

zt is revealed

Firm chooses
st and kt+1
Every firm arrives at period t with a pre-chosen level of capacity kt. Before any activity
takes place the firm observes the (firm-specific) vector of productivity levels in both sectors,
zt. With this information at hand, each firm makes the following choices during the period
t:
• the optimal sectoral decision for the current period, st, by choosing whether to operate
one (st = 1 or 2) or both (st = 3) production units in period t;
• the optimal allocation of capital and labor across its activities;
• how much to invest for the future, it, and, as a consequence, the total amount of
capacity to install at the beginning of the next period, kt+1.
A firm that chooses to focus its activities in sector st alone generates the following profits
during period t:
π(st, kt, zt; Wt) = max
lt
{
ez
s
t kαkt l
αl
t − Wtlt − f
}
, st = 1, 2 (5)
where f ≥ 0 is a fixed cost of production that must be paid if the firm is active in sector s.4
4Fixed costs guarantee a minimum scale of production, thus forcing a firm to stay focused, unless outside
opportunities are sufficiently attractive. As we show below, without fixed costs a firm will always be
diversified.
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Conversely, if the firm chooses to be diversified (so that st = 3), profits are described by:
π(3, kt, zt; Wt) = max
lt,θt
{
ez
1
t (θtkt)
αk(θtlt)
αl + ez
2
t ((1 − θt)kt)αk((1 − θt)lt)αl (6)
−Wtlt − (2 − λ)f} ,
s.t. 0 ≤ θt ≤ 1,
where θt denotes the fraction of resources (capital and labor) that the diversified firm
allocates to sector 1 in period t.5 Because diversified firms operate in both sectors, they
face larger fixed costs of production. However, equation (6) embeds our assumption that
they can eliminate redundancies and thus save a fraction λ/2 of the combined costs. Thus,
a conglomerate pays only fixed costs in the amount (2 − λ)f.
The solution to these static optimization problems yields optimal decision rules for total
firm employment, lt = l(st, kt, zt; Wt), the size of each segment, θt = θ(st, kt, zt; Wt), as well
as total production, yt = y(st, kt, zt; Wt).
2.1.2 Discussion
Our environment is constructed to incorporate the basic incentives for the creation of
conglomerates identified by the literature on firm diversification. Somewhat loosely our
model emphasizes some of the most popular advantages of firm diversification: “synergies”
and the exploration of “free” cash flows. Synergies are created through the elimination of
redundancies across business lines, such as overhead. In our model, this feature is captured
by the savings parameter λ. Such dilution of costs generates a form of economies of scope and
creates an incentive for diversification. Decreasing returns to scale in each activity generate
something like a “free cash flow” effect: as the firm grows in size, marginal productivities fall
and it becomes unprofitable for the firm to invest additional resources in on-going activities.
Instead, the firm can better use resources by exploring new production possibilities. Thus,
diversification is more likely to be optimal for large firms, since it enables them to overcome
the decreasing returns nature of the single sector technology. This feature is also consistent
with the empirical observation that large firms are much more likely to become diversified.
5Since wages and prices do not differ across sectors, capital-labor ratios must also be identical. It follows
that the conglomerate must allocate the same share of capital and labor inputs to each sector.
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In addition to these core advantages, conglomerates also benefit from two additional
features of our environment. They have more options than stand-alone firms (the mobility
restriction (1)). Although this is not a crucial feature of our model, it stands in contrast to
Bernardo and Chowdry (2002), who rationalize the diversification discount by assuming that
focused firms have more options than conglomerates. Finally, since the productivity shocks
z1t and z
2
t are not perfectly correlated (as in equation (3) above), firm diversification also
lowers cash flow risk. In the absence of trading frictions, however, this risk pooling can be
easily replicated by a portfolio of stand-alone firms and therefore is not valued by investors.
Synergies and overcoming decreasing returns, however, generate value to shareholders.
In each of these cases production is more efficient and resources are saved, when operations
are combined in a conglomerate. Hence, unlike much of the literature, our model captures
some of the most plausible benefits to corporate diversification while abstracting from any
of its potential drawbacks, such as those induced by agency or behavioral problems.
We believe that emphasizing these advantages of the conglomerates is important because
it ensures that a model does not deliver a diversification discount “by assumption”. Since
conglomerates have generally more resources and better opportunities in our model, their
low valuation can only be the endogenous outcome of self-selection and not the obvious
consequence of assuming that focused firms are, a priori, better. As a number of recent
studies suggest, this explanation seems to consistent with the available evidence.
2.1.3 Optimality
Let (s, k, z) denote the state for a firm that was active in sector s in period t−1, has k units
of installed capacity at the beginning of period t, and faces a vector of productivity shocks
z. The optimal behavior of this firm can be summarized by the value function v(s, k, z; W ),
that solves the dynamic programming problem:
v(s, k, z; W ) = max
k′,s′
{
π(s′, k, z; W ) + (1 − δ)k − k′ + β
∫
v(s′, k′, z′; W ′)N(dz′|z)
}
(7)
subject to equation (1).6 Here 0 < β < 1 is the intertemporal discount factor and N(dz′|z)
is the cumulative (Gaussian) distribution of z′, conditional on z. Note that current cash
6We use the convention s′, k′, z′, etc. to denote the value of the state variables that are relevant at the
beginning of the next period.
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flows (dividends) are given by current profits, π(·), net of investment spending, i, which is
described by (4). Proposition 1 establishes the existence of a unique function v(s, k, z), that
satisfies (7), and lists some of its basic properties.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique function v(s, k, z) that solves the dynamic program
(7). Moreover, this function is (i) continuous; and (ii) increasing in both k and z.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that the value function is always increasing in the vector of shocks z = (z1, z2). In
other words, the value of the firm increases in each shock, regardless of whether the firm was
operating in that sector or not. Finally, the solution to the dynamic programming problem
(7) also produces a set of policy functions, k(s, k, z; W ) and s(s, k, z; W ), associated with the
optimal accumulation of capital and the sectoral choices of the firm. It is straightforward to
show that all these functions are well defined.
2.1.4 The Decision to Diversify
Before exploring the quantitative implications of the model, it is useful to study some of
the inner workings of our model, to try to gain some intuition about our numerical results
below. Accordingly, this section attempts to shed some light on the optimal diversification
decision of an individual firm.
The optimal industrial decision, s′ = s(s, k, z), can be computed as follows. First, define
the function
p(s′, k, z) ≡ π(s′, k, z) + (1 − δ)k + max
k′
{
β
∫
v(s′, k′, z′)N(dz′|z) − k′
}
(8)
as the value of the firm, conditional on having adopted sectoral decision s′ in the current
period. Since focused firms are not allowed to simply switch sectors, a firm that was
previously specialized in sector s ∈ {1, 2}, finds corporate diversification optimal if, and
only if:7
p(3, k, z) ≥ p(s′, k, z) |s′=s= p(s, k, z)
7Similarly, a firm that was diversified in the previous period (s = 3) will choose to remain diversified if
p(3, k, z) ≥ max {p(1, k, z), p(2, k, z)} .
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However, it is probably more useful to represent this decision on the space of state
variables. Proposition 2 shows how this can be done, by defining something analogous to an
“indifference curve”, or, perhaps more appropriately, a “diversification threshold”, separating
the decisions to diversify or not into different regions of the state space.8 Proposition 2 also
establishes the key properties of this threshold.
Proposition 2 The optimal diversification decision can be characterized by the unique
threshold value:
k̂(s, z) = arg min
k
{s(s, k, z) = 3} , ∀(s, z) ∈ S × Z (9)
Moreover, k̂(s, z), is: (i) increasing in zs and, (ii) decreasing in zs̃, s = s̃.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 2 illustrates these results by showing the shape of the optimal sectoral decision
for a firm previously focused in sector 1, s(1, k, z). The Figure depicts the diversification
threshold, holding the level of z2 fixed. Remember that this firm can only choose to remain
in sector 1, or to diversify. By definition, points along this line correspond to combinations of
productivity, z, and size, k, for which the firm is indifferent between focusing and diversifying.
The positive slope of k̂(1, z), implies that, given size, firms are more likely to remain
focused when productivity is high in the incumbent sector, z1, while diversification becomes
optimal when this productivity becomes too low. Similarly, holding productivity constant,
diversification is more likely for large firms, a consequence of decreasing returns to scale.
It is this endogenous selection feature of our model that drives several of our quantitative
results below and, in particular, our findings of a diversification discount in the cross-section
of firms. Thus, the model formalizes the argument proposed in several empirical studies (see
Chevalier (1999), Villalonga (2001), Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002), and Campa and
Kedia (2002)), that conglomerates are not simply a random subsample of the cross-sectional
distribution of firms. Instead, because the decision to diversify is endogenous, it is associated
with ex-ante differences in firm-specific features such as productivity and size. These ex-ante
features account for the findings about ex-post performance and valuation of conglomerates.
8Formally, this threshold is a separating hyperplane in the 4-dimensional space of state variables.
9
Figure 2: The Diversification Threshold
This Figure illustrates the shape of the optimal sectoral decision, s(1, k, z), for a firm that was previously
focused in sector 1. The horizontal axis shows capacity, k, and the vertical axis shows the level of productivity
in on-going activities, z1. Since the firm was previously focused in sector 1, it has only two choices: it can
either remain in sector 1 in the current period, or it can diversify and operate in both sectors simultaneously.
The Figure shows the contour line of the optimal sectoral decision, holding the level of productivity in the
other sector, z2, fixed. Points along this line correspond to combinations of productivity, z, and size, k, for
which the firm is indifferent between focusing and diversifying.

z1
focus
diversify
k
0
k̂(1, z)
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Corollaries 3 and 4 establish two additional properties of the optimal industrial strategy
s(s, k, z). Corollary 3 shows why the role of fixed costs is crucial in our analysis. Without
them, profits are always positive in both sectors and the firm would have no incentive to
focus, given the assumption of decreasing returns to scale. Corollary 4 shows that if synergies
are sufficiently large there is never an incentive for the firm to be focused.
Corollary 3 In the absence of fixed costs (f = 0), diversification is always optimal.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Corollary 4 Suppose f > 0. Diversification is the optimal corporate strategy if λ ≥ 1, i.e.
synergies are sufficiently large.
Proof. See Appendix A.
2.2 Aggregation and Equilibrium
To provide a detailed evaluation of the implications of our model, we need to construct an
artificial panel of firms that can then be used to examine the available empirical evidence.
We can do this by aggregating the individual decisions of every firm in the economy and
computing the equilibrium in our model. Since each firm can be described by the (s, k, z),
the cross-sectional distribution of firms is completely summarized by a measure, µ(s, k, z),
defined over this state space. The law of motion for µ is given by:
µ′(s′, k′, z′) =
∫
1{k′=k(s,k,z;W )} × 1{s′=s(s,k,z;W )}N(z′|dz)µ(ds, dk, z), (10)
where 1{.} is an indicator function that equals 1 if the argument is satisfied and 0
otherwise. Intuitively, next period’s cross-sectional distribution of firms is determined by
combining the exogenous transition probabilities implied by N(·) with the endogenous ones,
prescribed by the optimal policies for capacity, k(s, k, z), and sectoral choices, s(s, k, z). For
empirical purposes we are interested in the properties of a stationary equilibrium where this
distribution does not depend on initial conditions, so that µ′ = µ.
To close the model, we must offer a description of market demand for the final goods
produced, as well as the supply of labor input. While it is easy to provide reduced form
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expression for these functions, it is also straightforward to show how this can be done in
general equilibrium by adding a very stylized description of household/shareholder behavior.
Specifically, we summarize the household sector with a single representative agent deriving
utility from leisure, L, and consumption, C, and income from wages, W , and dividends,
D. Without aggregate uncertainty, all aggregate quantities and prices are constant and the
consumer problem collapses to the static representation:
max
C,L
U = ln(C − AL) (11)
s.t. C = WL + D.
The optimality conditions for this problem yield a demand for final goods given by
C = C(µ; W,D) and an infinitely elastic labor supply which pins down the wage rate at
W = A.9
A stationary equilibrium for this economy is characterized by the following definition.
Definition 5 (Stationary Equilibrium) A stationary competitive equilibrium is: (i) a
set of optimal polices k(·), l(·),π(·) and s(·) and a value function v(·) for each firm; (ii) an
optimal allocation rule C(µ; W ) for the representative household; (iii) a wage rate W and
(iv) a stationary measure µ of firms such that:
C(µ; A) = A
∫
l(s, k, z; W )µ(ds, dk, dz) + D(µ; A) (12)
Equation (12) also summarizes labor market equilibrium, by imposing W = A. It also
uses the fact that aggregate dividends are given by10
D(µ; A) =
∫
π(s, k, z; A)µ(ds, dk, dz) −
∫
(k(s, k, z; A) − (1 − δ)k) µ(ds, dk, dz). (13)
Given our assumptions, establishing the existence of a stationary competitive equilibrium
is immediate.11 Although the definition seems abstract and its computation is non-trivial,
this equilibrium concept is the key to our analysis. It delivers a non-degenerate cross-sectional
distribution of firms, µ, which provides us with an artificial dataset of firms of different size,
productivities, and more importantly, diversification strategies. With this information at
hand we are ready to address the key empirical findings in this area.
9This problem is equivalent to that of a shareholder investing in the stocks of each firm (Gomes (2001)).
10Note that π(s′, k, z;W ) = π(s(s, k, z), k, z;W ) = π(s, k, z;W ). Similarly, for l(s, k, z;W ) = l(s′, k, z;W ).
11The proof follows the arguments provided in Hopenhayn (1992) and Gomes (2001).
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3 Quantitative Results
Computing the stationary equilibrium involves two steps. First, we must specify parameter
values. These must be selected to be consistent with either long run properties of the data
(unconditional first moments) or with prior empirical evidence. Second, we develop and
implement a numerical algorithm capable of approximating the stationary equilibrium up
to an arbitrarily small error. Appendix B describes this procedure in detail. With the
equilibrium computed, we focus on two key empirical issues. Section 3.2 investigates the
model’s implications for the so-called “diversification discount”, by comparing our predictions
with the results in Lang and Stulz (1994). Since our model implies that diversification is
driven by productivity differentials, it is important to investigate its predictions for the
relation between firm diversification and productivity. Section 3.3 explores this issue by
comparing our results with the empirical evidence in Schoar (2002).
3.1 Calibration and Summary Statistics
Since most data is available at an annual frequency, we assume that a time period in the
model corresponds to one year. The calibration exercise is divided in two parts. First, we
use independent evidence on the degree of returns to scale (Burnside’s (1996)) to set the
output elasticities αl = 0.65 and αk = 0.3. The rate of depreciation in the capital stock is
set to 0.1, a value close to that found in the data by Gomes (2001).
The four remaining parameters, f, λ, σ, and ρ, cannot be individually identified from
the available data. Instead, they are chosen so that the model is able to approximate the
unconditional moments on the panel studied by Lang and Stulz (1994) for Compustat. Since
the main stylized facts are, in effect, conditional moments, or regressions, from this panel, this
seems appropriate. Accordingly, we select these parameters so that the model approximates
the cross-sectional mean and dispersion of Tobin’s Q, the fraction of diversified firms in the
sample, and the average level of Q for conglomerates.12
12The preference parameters are not important and we simply use β = 1/1.065 and A = W = 0.5.
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Table 1: : Parameter Choices
This table reports our parameter choices. The time period is one year. Output elasticities, αk and αl are
set using evidence from Burnside (1996). The rate of depreciation for the capital stock, δ, is set close to the
value found by Gomes (2001). The four remaining parameters, f , λ, σ, and ρ are chosen so that the model
approximates four unconditional moments from the COMPUSTAT panel studied by Lang and Stulz (1994).
The moments are the mean and standard deviation of Tobin’s Q, the number (percentage) of diversified
firms in the sample and the average level of Tobin’s Q for conglomerates.
Parameter Benchmark Value
Technology
αk 0.3
αl 0.65
δ 0.1
f 0.002
λ 0.6
Shocks
σ 0.025
ρ 0.95
Table 2: : Summary Statistic
This Table compares the summary statistics generated by the stationary equilibrium of the model, given the
parameter choices in Table 1, with those of the COMPUSTAT panel studied by Lang and Stulz (1994) and
reported in Table 1 of their paper.
Statistics Data Model
Fraction Focused Firms 0.40 0.33
Tobin’s Q
Average 1.11 1.87
Standard Deviation 1.22 1.11
Average (Conglomerates) 0.91 1.56
14
Table 1 summarizes our calibration procedure while Table 2 compares the key summary
statistics generated by the stationary equilibrium of the model with those of the Compustat
dataset used by Lang and Stulz (1994). Although our model calibration does not reproduce
these four statistics exactly, the artificial sample is reasonably similar to its empirical
counterpart, particularly in terms of cross-sectional dispersion and the relative weight of
conglomerates in the sample, the two crucial elements for statistical inference.
3.2 Diversification Discount
Most empirical studies on the efficiency of conglomerates examine the relation between
diversification and firm value, as measure by Tobin’s (average) Q. Specifically, this is often
done by estimating linear reduced form equations:
Qit = b0 + b1DIVit + b2 ln(kit) + ξit, (14)
where Qit is the value of Tobin’s Q for firm i at the beginning of period t, kit is the beginning
of period size of the firm, and DIVit is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if firm is
diversified in period t and zero otherwise.
In the context of our model, it is straightforward to estimate equation (14) for our artificial
panel of firms by defining the variables:
Q =
p(s′, k, z)
k
,
and
DIV =
{
1, if s′ = 3
0, else
,
where p(s′, k, z) denotes the value of the firm of size k that chooses to operate in sector s in
period t.
Table 3 compares the results of estimating (14) in our model with the empirical findings
in Lang and Stulz (1994). In all cases we report the means across 100 simulations, for both
the coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics. As in Lang and Stulz (1994), Table 3
reports results for both the full panel and a subset that includes only those firms with a
value of Q below 5.13
13When possible we focus on the numbers reported by Lang and Stulz (1994) for “industry-adjusted” Q′s,
since these control for the fact that diversified firms are generally concentrated in low Q industries.
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Table 3: : The Diversification Discount
This Table reports the results of estimating the following regression:
Qit = b0 + b1DIVit + b2 ln(kit) + ξit,
on our artificial panel of firms. Here Qit is the value of Tobin’s Q for firm i at the beginning of period
t, kit is the beginning of period size of the firm, and DIVit is a dummy variable that takes value one if
firm is diversified in period t and zero otherwise. The results of this estimation are then compared with
the empirical findings from Table 6 in Lang and Stulz (1994). In all cases we report the means across 100
simulations, for both the coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics. The Table also reports our findings
for the subset of firms for which the value of Q is below 5, and compares those with the results in Lang and
Stulz (1994).
All Firms Q < 5
Variable Data Model Data Model
DIV
(t-stat)
−0.34
(−3.77)
−0.20
(−5.39)
−0.29
(−4.53)
−0.07
(−3.71)
log(k)
(t-stat)
−0.12
(−3.48)
−0.70
(−5.26)
−0.13
(−5.22)
−0.31
(−5.29)
16
Overall the model performs very well. As in the data, we consistently find that diversified
firms are discounted, that this discount is statistically significant, and that this is only
partially accounted for by differences in firm size (the coefficient on ln(k)). Moreover, the
model also predicts a diversification discount that is quantitatively similar to that found in
the real data.
Looking only at the subset of firms with a value of Q below 5 shows that the observed
diversification discount is not due to a small number of outliers. Table 3 confirms that in
the model, as in the data, eliminating outliers does decrease the discount’s magnitude but
it does not eliminate it. Although smaller, the coefficient on the diversification dummy is
significant, both statistically and economically.
Thus, despite the fact that conglomerates operate efficiently and that diversification
clearly adds value to the firm, our model is able to rationalize the documented diversification
“discount”. Moreover, this discount also seems to possess the same robustness properties
that are observed in the actual data. Since diversification is optimal however, the explanation
cannot be that conglomerates destroy value. Instead, the success of the model hinges on the
endogenous selection mechanism identified in section 2.1.4.
It is important to note that our results accord with the view that conglomerates are
indeed less efficient firms. Crucially however, they are not inefficient. In particular, and as
long as λ > 0, separation of their units destroys shareholder value.
Finally, the exact magnitude of the discount depends on synergies created by the
conglomerate, measured by the parameter λ. Indeed, if these synergies are too large, the
discount may disappear altogether. We view this dependence as an important strength of
the model and a useful direction for future research. For instance, allowing λ to vary across
firms could rationalize recent evidence suggesting that the magnitude of the discount seems
to vary with the level of synergies created by diversification (for example Chevalier (2001)).
3.2.1 Source of the Diversification Discount
Following Lang and Stulz (1994), Tables 4 and 5 attempt to shed light on the source of the
discount. We focus on two subsamples of the full panel of firms: on-going conglomerates
and newly diversified firms. Table 4 reports the results of estimating (14) for the subsample
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of firms that do not change the number of segments in which they operate. Specifically,
we consider only the set of firms for which st = st−1 = ... = st−4, thus excluding all newly
diversified (as well as refocused) firms from the sample. As Table 4 documents, however,
excluding these newly diversified firms does not eliminate the observed discount both in the
data and in the model. Moreover, the actual value of the discount in our model is again very
close to that observed by Lang and Stulz (1994).
By contrast, Table 5 looks at the behavior of firms that change the numbers of segments
of activity across adjacent years. Specifically, these firms are classified as “diversifying”, if
they change the number of sectors they operate in from one to two (formally st−1 = 1 or 2
and st = 3) and “focusing” firms if they reduce the number of activities from 2 to 1 (st−1 = 3
and st = 1 or 2). These firms are then compared with those that maintained the number of
activities constant during the same period. For “diversifying” firms, the comparison group is
the set of other previously focused firms that chose not to become diversified in the current
period. Similarly, focusing firms are compared with other diversified firms that chose to
remain diversified.
Following Lang and Stulz (1994) we report two alternative results. First, we look at the
average differences in Q at the time that the firms choose to expand (or contract). Next, we
also look at the dynamic effects of the decision, by comparing the effects of diversification
(refocusing) on ∆Q.
The findings are somewhat inconclusive, both in the model and in the data. Whether
we look at levels or changes in Q, no coefficient is statistically significant. Although there
is some suggestion, again both in the model and the data, that diversifying firms seem to
experience drops in Q (while the opposite happens for focusing firms) the evidence is just
not strong enough. The model’s implications for the level of Q are somewhat less successful,
but again not statistically significant.14
Overall, Tables 4 and 5 broadly confirm the empirical success of our model. It is not only
capable of generating a diversification discount, but also provides quantitatively realistic
results for the subsets of existing and newly diversified firms.
14Intuitively, the lack of statistical significance in the artificial sample is a consequence of the small variation
in the shocks z. Although large variations would change this quantitative finding, a larger dispersion in z
would lead to an unrealistically high dispersion in Q.
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Table 4: : Firms With Constant Segments
This Table reports the results estimating the regression:
Qit = b0 + b1DIVit + b2 ln(kit) + ξit,
on our artificial panel of firms. Here Qit is the value of Tobin’s Q for firm i at the beginning of period t,
kit is the beginning of period size of the firm, and DIVit is a dummy variable that takes value one if firm is
diversified in period t and zero otherwise. The regression is performed only on the sub-sample of firms that
do not change the number of segments in which they operate for a number of years. Specifically, we consider
only firms for which st = st−1 = ... = st−4. In all cases we report the means across 100 simulations, for both
the coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics. The results of this estimation are then compared with the
empirical findings from Table 8 in Lang and Stulz (1994).
Variable Data Model
DIV
(t-stat)
−0.20
(−2.05)
−0.17
(−3.14)
ln(k)
(t-stat)
−0.03
(−0.64)
−0.66
(−3.48)
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Table 5: : Firms Changing Segments
This Table compares firms that change the numbers of segments of activity across adjacent years with those
firms that maintain the number of activities constant. Specifically, firms are classified as “diversifying” if
they change the number of sectors they operate from one to two (formally st−1 = 1 or 2 and st = 3). We
provide two separate results. First, we look at the average differences in Q at the time of the diversification
takes place by estimating the regression:
Qit = b0 + b1DIVit + ξit,
for the subset of previously focused firms (st−1 < 3). Here Qit is the value of Tobin’s Q for firm i at the
beginning of period t, and DIVit is a dummy variable that takes value one if firm has been focused at t−1 and
becomes diversified in period t and zero otherwise. Next, we look at the dynamic effects of diversification, by
comparing the effects of diversification on ∆Q.˙We accomplish that by estimating the following regression:
∆Qit = b0 + b1DIVit + ξit,
again only for the subset of previously focused firms. Here ∆Qit = Qit −Qit−1. This Table also reports the
effects of refocusing on firm value, by estimating the same regressions as above, and letting DIVit equal one
if firm has been diversified at t − 1 and becomes focused in period t and zero otherwise. These regressions
are only estimated for the subset of previously diversified firms. In all cases we report the means across 100
simulations, for both the coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics. The results of this estimation are
then compared with the empirical findings from Table 8 in Lang and Stulz (1994).
Regression on Qt Regression on ∆Qt = Qt+1 − Qt
Variable Data Model Data Model
Diversifying Firms
DIV
(t-stat)
−0.163
(−1.23)
0.045
(0.37)
−0.204
(−1.60)
−0.038
(−1.46)
Focusing Firms
DIV
(t-stat)
−0.016
(−0.70)
0.035
(1.40)
0.024
(1.39)
0.020
(1.22)
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3.2.2 Robustness
While our benchmark calibration appears quite successful it is interesting to examine the
robustness of our findings to alternative choices of parameter values, particularly in light of
the fact that there is relatively little a-priori evidence for the four parameters, f ,λ,σ, and ρ.
Table 3 investigates whether our main findings, regarding the existence of a diversification
discount, are sensitive to our choices for these parameters. Specifically, Table 6 compares the
results of fitting the regression equation (14) to artificial samples, generated by varying our
choices for the key parameters f ,λ,σ, and ρ. While the exact magnitude of the discount varies
across the different experiments, the basic qualitative finding of a diversification discount
seems robust. The alternative values are chosen to indicate which changes lead to lower
discounts. Thus, low variability in productivity (low σ or ρ) reduces the cross-sectional
variability in Q and thus the discount. High fixed costs, f , increase the cost savings of
conglomerates, λf , and lower the discount. Decreasing the cost savings λ also lowers the
implied discount. The reason is that lower synergies make diversification less attractive.
With a low λ most conglomerates are formed to take advantage of decreasing returns to
scale, and this effect is entirely captured by the large coefficient of ln k.
3.3 Diversification and Productivity
In our model productivity differentials play a key role in determining firm behavior and
the observed link between diversification and firm valuation. In this section, we investigate
whether the implied movements in firm and sectoral productivity are also consistent with
existing empirical evidence. In a recent study, Schoar (2002) carefully documents the
productivity patterns in manufacturing using the LRD database. Specifically, she computes
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) for each plant, j, in each firm, i, and every period, t, by
estimating the residual, εijt, in the following log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function:
ln(yijt) = ajt + bjt ln (kijt) + cjt ln (lijt) + εijt, (15)
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Table 6: : Robustness of the Diversification Discount
This Table examines the robustness of our findings by reporting the results of estimating the following
regression:
Qit = b0 + b1DIVit + b2 ln(kit) + ξit,
on several artificial panels of firms, obtained by varying the choice values for key parameters of the model.
Here Qit is the value of Tobin’s Q for firm i at the beginning of period t, kit is the beginning of period
size of the firm, and DIVit is a dummy variable that takes value one if firm is diversified in period t and
zero otherwise. In all cases we report the means across 100 simulations, for both the coefficients and the
corresponding t-statistics.
Variable Baseline f = 0.004 λ = 0.5 σ = 0.02 ρ = 0.75
DIV
(t-stat)
−0.20
(−5.39)
−0.03
(−1.81)
−0.12
(−3.55)
−0.07
(−5.98)
−0.05
(−7.02)
log(k)
(t-stat)
−0.70
(−5.26)
−0.23
(−26.95)
−0.70
(−14.9)
−0.21
(−41.13)
−0.27
(−9.51)
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Given this measure of productivity, we can examine the relation between firm
diversification and firm productivity. Schoar (2002) focuses on two measures. First, she
seeks to capture static differences in average productivity across firms by estimating the
following equation:
TFPijt = a1 + b1 × SEGit + µijt. (16)
where SEGit is the logarithm of the number of segments in which firm i operates in period
t. Thus, estimating b1 > 0 implies that diversified (multi-segment) firms are, on average,
more productive than focused firms. In addition, she also examines the dynamic effects of
diversification on future productivity. This is accomplished by estimating the equation:
TFPijt = a2 + b2 × AFTERit + νijt. (17)
where AFTERit is defined as a dummy variable that equals one in the period after the
firm diversifies and it is equal to zero otherwise.15 Thus, a finding of b2 > 0 implies that
diversification improves plant productivity.
It is again relatively straightforward to use the artificial panel of firms generated by our
model to replicate Schoar’s (2002) procedures and compare the results. Given our measures
of capital, labor and output and assuming that each activity corresponds to one plant we
can easily estimate (15-17). Table 7 compares our findings with the results in Tables II and
IV from Schoar (2002).
While Schoar (2002) finds a significant productivity premium of more than 3% for
diversified firms, our model implies that focused firms are, on average, 2.3% more productive.
However, this result depends on the magnitude of the diversification discount, since lower
productivity leads to lower valuations. This is important since in Schoar’s LRD sample the
average market discount for diversified firms is only about 10%, while our model, which
is calibrated to replicate the Lang and Stulz’s (1994) results, implies a discount of about
20%. The last column of Table 7 addresses this issue by recalibrating our model to generate a
discount of exactly 10%, thus making our results directly comparable with hers. We find that
in this case our model can also match the observed productivity premium for conglomerates.
15Schoar (2002) also adds variables such as age and the number of segments the firm operates. In the
context of our model, however, age is not defined and the number of segments is redundant.
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Table 7: : Diversification and Productivity
This Table compares of our findings with the results in Tables II and IV from Schoar (2002). First, we
capture static differences in average productivity across firms by estimating the equation:
TFPijt = a1 + b1 × SEGit + µijt.
where TFPij and SEGit denote, respectively, total factor productivity in segment j and the logarithm of
the number of segments in which firm i operates in period t. Second, the dynamic effects of diversification
on future productivity are summarized with the regression:
TFPijt = a2 + b2 × AFTERit + νijt.
where AFTERit defined as a dummy variable that equals one in the period after the firm diversifies and it
is equal to zero otherwise. Results are reported for the benchmark case and an alternative calibration that
matches Schoar’s finding of 10% discount. In both cases we report the means across 100 simulations, for
both the coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics.
Variable Data Model
Baseline 10% Discount
SEG
(t-stat)
0.034
(2.13)
−0.023
(−22.38)
0.009
(18.58)
AFTER
(t-stat)
−0.026
(−6.50)
−0.013
(−7.81)
−0.008
(−2.27)
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Table 7 also shows that our model successfully reproduces the observed losses of
productivity after the firm diversifies.16 As Schoar (2002) argues, these findings reinforce the
importance of distinguishing between the static effect of being diversified and the dynamic
effect of becoming diversified. From a static, or cross-sectional, point-of-view, diversified
firms are, on average, more productive than focused firms. However, as Figure 1 illustrates,
diversification in our model is often the result of bad productivity shocks in on-going
activities. Thus, it is not surprising to find that, on average, diversification is associated
with productivity losses in incumbent sectors, just as Schoar (2002) finds.17
These results suggest that our basic argument that diversification decisions are driven
by efficient responses to productivity differentials is not the result of assuming unrealistic
patterns for productivity. The fact that our model is consistent with much of the evidence
also suggests a possible alternative interpretation to the more popular “new toy effect”,
that emphasizes a shift in focus by managers towards the newly acquired segments at the
expense of incumbent ones. Our findings show that this evidence can also be rationalized in
the context of a value maximizing model.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we show that a general dynamic model of optimal behavior of a firm that
maximizes shareholder value is actually consistent with the main empirical findings about
firm diversification and performance. Here, diversification is a natural result of firm growth
and it stems from dynamic firm strategies that maximize value. Diversification allows a firm
to explore new productive opportunities, while taking advantage of economies of scale and
reducing the volatility of its cash flows.
The dynamic structure of our model allows us to examine several aspects of the
relationship between firm diversification and performance in a very general setting. In
particular, we need not place any significant restrictions on the nature of functional forms
or parameter values in our model, beyond those already discussed. The very forces leading
16Here, our results can only be compared with Schoar’s (2002) estimates for incumbent plants since, in
our model, new plants have no prior history.
17Firms may also diversify if the diversification threshold moves because outside opportunities improve.
In this case productivity in the incumbent sector need not fall for these firms.
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to optimal diversification, are sufficient to generate a wealth of realistic features, regarding
firm diversification, size, productivity and valuations.
We obtain several important results. First, we can show that firms currently expanding
are not only less productive than other (non-expanding) focused firms, but they also
experience productivity losses after the expansion, as documented by Schoar (2002). Second,
as Santalo (2001), we find that size differences can account for part of the differences both
in productivity and valuation across focused and diversifying firms. However, we also show
that this size “effect”, can not account for all of these differences. Finally, and perhaps more
surprisingly, we show that despite all the obvious advantages to firm diversification and the
fact that firm diversification does not destroy value in our model, it is still possible to obtain
a diversification discount as documented by Lang and Stulz (1994).
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A Proofs
We derive all formal proofs under the most general set of conditions. Accordingly, define the
set S = {1, 2, 3}. Let K × L ⊆ R2+ be the space of inputs and suppose that the stochastic
process for the shock has a bounded support Z = [z, z]×[z, z], −∞ < z < z < ∞. Moreover,
define 
z and 
k as the minimal sigma-fields generated by Z and K, respectively. Finally
let F (k, l) denote a general decreasing returns to scale technology and Q(zt+1|zt) be the
transition function of z.
We make the following minimal assumptions regarding the nature of these functions and
the size of the fixed costs.
Assumption 1 The production function F (•): (i) is continuously differentiable; (ii) is
strictly increasing; (iii) is strictly concave; (iv) satisfies the standard Inada conditions; and
(v) exhibits decreasing returns to scale in k and l.
Assumption 2 The technology levels zt = (z
1
t , z
2
t ) follow a joint Markov transition function
Q(zt+1, zt) : Z ×
z → [0, 1]× [0, 1] that: (i) is stationary, (ii) is monotone and (iii) satisfies
the Feller property. Let G(z) denote the invariant distribution of z.
Assumption 3 The fixed costs of production, f, are not too large, i.e. ∃k ∈ R+ : f ≤
zF (k, l).
Proof of Proposition 1. To show existence and uniqueness define the operator
(Tv)(s, k, z) = max
{k′,s′}
{
π(s′, k, z) + (1 − δ)k − k′ + β
∫
v(s′, k′, z′)Q(dz′, z)
}
, (A1)
s′ ∈
{ {s, 3}, s = 1, 2
S, s = 3
.
Let C(S × K × Z) be the space of all bounded and continuous functions in S × K × Z.
The proof is in two steps:
(a) T : C(S × K × Z) −→ C(S × K × Z) (Lemma 1);
(b) T is a contraction in C(S × K × Z) (Lemma 2).
The Contraction Mapping Theorem then guarantees that there is a unique fixed point
that satisfies (A1).
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Monotonicity then follows immediately from Theorems 9.7 and 9.11 in Stokey and Lucas
(1989).
Lemma 1 T : C(S × K × Z) −→ C(S × K × Z) .
Proof. Suppose v(s′, k′, z′) ∈ C(S × K × Z). Since Q(dz′|z) has the Feller property it
follows from Lemma 9.5 in Stokey and Lucas (89) that∫
v(s′, k′, z′)Q(dz′, z) ∈ C(S × K × Z).
Since π(s′, k, z) is also bounded and continuous, the result follows immediately.
Lemma 2 T is a contraction in C(S × K × Z).
Proof. The proof uses Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a contraction.
(a)Monotonicity.
Consider v1(s, k, z), v2(s, k, z) ∈ C(S × K × Z), such that v1(s, k, z) ≥ v2(s, k, z). It
follows that ∫
v1(s
′, k′, z′)Q(dz′, z) ≥
∫
v2(s
′, k′, z′)Q(dz′, z),
and hence
(Tv1)(s, k, z) ≥ (Tv2)(s, k, z).
(b) Discounting
Let a ∈ R and v(s, k, z) ∈ C(S × K × Z). It follows that
(Tv + a)(s, k, z) = v(s, k, z) + βa = (Tv)(s, k, z) + βa.
Proof of Proposition 2 Using (8) we can rewrite the optimal diversification decision of
a focused firm as
Π(s, k, z) + Ψ(s, z) ≥ (1 − λ)f, s ∈ {1, 2} (A2)
where
Π(s, k, z) ≡ π(3, k, z) − π(s, k, z) + (1 − λ)f, (A3)
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and
Ψ(s, z) = Ψ(s′, z) |s′=s≡ max
k′
{
β
∫
v(3, k′, z′)Q(dz′, z) − k′
}
−
−max
k′
{
β
∫
v(s, k′, z′)Q(dz′, z) − k′
}
. (A4)
Equation (A2) decomposes the optimal diversification decision into a “profit” component,
Π(s, k, z), and an “option” component, Ψ(s, z), associated with the continuation payoffs. By
definition k̂(s, z), satisfies
Π(s, k̂(s, z), z) + Ψ(s, z) = (1 − λ)f, ∀(s, z) ∈ S × Z (A5)
Lemmas 3 and 4 imply that the left hand side is non-negative and strictly increasing in k.
Hence, if diversification is optimal for k = k̂(s, z), it must also be optimal for k > k̂(s, z). If
the left hand side exceeds (1 − λ)f then diversification is always optimal and k̂(s, z) = 0.
To establish monotonicity let z = (zs, zs̃) and ẑ = (zs +∆zs, zs̃), with ∆zs > 0. It follows
from (A5) that
Π(s, k̂(s, ẑ), ẑ) + Ψ(s, ẑ) = (1 − λ)f.
Lemmas 3 and 4 imply that both Π(·) and Ψ(·) are decreasing in zs. Since Π(·) is increasing
in k, it follows that k̂(s, ẑ) > k̂(s, z).
Analogously, let ẑ = (zs, zs̃+∆zs̃), with ∆zs̃ > 0. Since both Π(·) and Ψ(·) are increasing
in zs̃ (Lemmas 3 and 4), it follows that k̂(s, ẑ) < k̂(s, z).
Now consider a previously diversified firm. Here the threshold is determined by
p(3, k̂(s, z), z) ≥ max
{
p(1, k̂(s, z), z), p(2, k̂(s, z), z)
}
(A6)
or, simply, by
min
s∈{1,2}
{
Π(s, k̂(s, z), z) + Ψ(s, z)
}
= (1 − λ)f, ∀z ∈ Z (A7)
Again the left hand side is non-negative and strictly increasing in k, since Π(s, k, z)+Ψ(s, z)
has these properties as well, and the result follows as above.
Lemma 3 Let Π(s, k, z) be defined by (A3). Then Π(s, k, z) is (i) non-negative; (ii) weakly
increasing in k; and (iii) decreasing in zs and increasing in zs̃, s = s̃.
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Proof. (i) Π(s, k, z) ≥ 0. By definition
π(3, k, z) = π(1, θ∗k, z) + π(2, (1 − θ∗)k, z) + λf
where θ∗ = θ(k, z), is the optimal share of capital allocated to sector 1. Clearly then
π(3, k, z) ≡
{
π(1, k, z) − (1 − λ)f,
π(2, k, z) − (1 − λ)f,
θ∗ = 1
θ∗ = 0
since θ∗ is chosen optimally, it follows that
Π(s, k, z) = π(3, k, z) − π(s, k, z) ≥ 0
(ii) Monotonicity in k. Taking derivatives of π(3, k, z) with respect to k we obtain
∂π(3, k, z)
∂k
=
∂π(1, θ∗k, z)
∂(θk)
(
k
∂θ∗
∂k
+ θ∗
)
+
∂π(2, (1 − θ∗)k, z)
∂(θk)
(
−k∂θ
∗
∂k
+ (1 − θ∗)
)
Noting that the optimal choice of θ∗ implies
∂π(1, θ∗k, z)
∂(θk)
=
∂π(2, (1 − θ∗)k, z)
∂(θk)
,
we immediately obtain
∂π(3, k, z)
∂k
=
∂π(s′, θ∗k, z)
∂(θk)
≥ ∂π(s, k, z)
∂k
, s = 1, 2.
Where the inequality follows from the fact that the profit function is strictly concave and
θ ≤ 1. Since
∂Π(s, k, z)
∂k
=
∂π(3, k, z)
∂k
− ∂π(s, k, z)
∂k
≥ 0, s = 1, 2
(iii) Monotonicity in z. Taking derivatives of π(3, k, z) with respect to zs and simplifying as
in (ii) we obtain
∂π(3, k, z)
∂zs
=
∂π(s, θ∗k, z)
∂zs
+
∂π(s̃, (1 − θ∗)k, z)
∂zs
=
∂π(s, θ∗k, z)
∂zs
since production in sector s̃ does not depend on the shock to sector i. Now, using the
envelope theorem and the profits definitions (6) and (5) yields
∂π(3, k, z)
∂zs
= F (θ∗ks, ·) ≤ F (ks, ·) = ∂π(s, k, z)
∂zs
.
and hence that
∂Π(s, k, z)
∂zs
≤ 0, s = 1, 2.
Monotonicity in zs̃ follows immediately from the fact that π(s, k, z) depends only on zs.
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Lemma 4 Let Ψ(s, z) be defined by (A4). Then Ψ(s, z) is: (i) non-negative; and (ii)
decreasing in zs and increasing in zs̃, s = s̃.
Proof. (i) Ψ(s, z) ≥ 0. First note that
v(3, k′, z′) = max {p(1, k′, z′), p(2, k′, z′), p(3, k′, z′)}
≥ max {p(s′′, k′, z′), p(3, k′, z′)} = v(s′, k′, z′),
∀(k′, z′) ∈ K × Z,∀s′′ ∈ {1, 2},
From monotonicity of Q(·) it follows that∫
max {p(1, k′, z′), p(2, k′, z′), p(3, k′, z′)}Q(dz′, z)
≥
∫
max {p(s′′, k′, z′), p(3, k′, z′)}Q(dz′, z),
Hence for any value of z ∈ Z and any value of k′ ∈ K
β
∫
v(3, k′, z′)Q(dz′, z) − k′ ≥ β
∫
v(s′, k′, z′)Q(dz′, z) − k′.
Since this holds for every value of k′ it follows that it holds at the maximum and Ψ(s, z) ≥ 0.
(ii) Ψ(s, z) is decreasing in zs and increasing in zs̃, s = s̃. Suppose zs >> zs̃. Then
p(s, k, z) >> p(s̃, k, z),
and consequently
v(3, k, z) ≈ max {p(s, k, z), p(3, k, z)} .
Given the monotonicity of Q(·) it follows that:∫
v(3, k′, z′)Q(dz′, z) ≈
∫
max {p(s, k′, z′), p(3, k′, z′)}Q(dz′, z) =
∫
v(s, k′, z′)Q(dz′, z),
and, therefore, Ψ(s, z) = 0.
Now suppose that the opposite is true, i.e. zs << zs̃. In that case
v(3, k, z) ≈ max {p(s̃, k, z), p(3, k, z)}
and∫
v(3, k′, z′)Q(dz′, z) ≈
∫
max {p(s̃, k′, z′), p(3, k′, z′)}Q(dz′, z) >
∫
v(s, k′, z′)Q(dz′, z).
which implies that Ψ(s, z) > 0. It follows from continuity of both v(·) and Q(·) that Ψ(s, z)
must fall with zs.
An identical argument can be constructed to establish that Ψ(s, z) increases with zs̃.
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Proof of Corollary 3 In the absence of fixed costs inequality (A2) is always satisfied.
Proof of Corollary 4 Inequality (A2) is always satisfied if λ ≥ 1.
B Solution Method
The computational strategy involves the following steps
1. Solving the Bellman Equation (7) and computing the optimal firm decision rules;
2. Using the optimal decision rules to iterate on (10) and compute the stationary measure
µ = µ′ = µ∗
3. Computing aggregate quantities and using the market clearing condition (12) to
determine the equilibrium levels of consumption and labor.
Given the properties of our problem, the first step is better implemented with the less
efficient but more robust method of value function iteration on a discrete state space.
We specify a grid with a finite number of points for the capital stock as well as a finite
approximation to the normal random vector z. The later task is accomplished using in
Tauchen and Hussey’s (1991) method for optimal discrete state space approximations to
normal random variables. We use 15 × 15 grid points for this procedure. The space for
the capital stock is divided in 201 equally spaced elements. In either case the results were
relatively unchanged when we use finer grids. The upper bound for capacity, k, was chosen
to be non-binding at all times.
To compute µ∗, we take the optimal value function v(s, k, z) and the decision rules
k(s, k, z) and s(s, k, z), as well as the stochastic process for the technology shocks z and
proceed as follows:
• Define the size of the panel data, by specifying the number of firms M and the length
of time T.
• Simulate a sequence of exogenous technology shocks zit = (z1it, z2it) for each firm i in
every period t.
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• For the initial period
(i) Initiate each firm’s capital stock at k = k0.
(ii) Start the simulation by using draws from a uniform distribution to randomly
allocating firms to either sector 1 or 2.
• For all other periods
(i) Given the current state for each firm i, (sit−1, kit, zit) use the optimal policy functions
to determine next period’s capital stock, kit+1, and sectoral decision, sit.
(ii) Using the value function, compute the current market value of the firm i, vit.
(iii) Using the stochastic process for z, compute next period’s shock zit+1.
(v) Construct the cross-sectional distribution of firms µit = µ(sit, kit, zit).
• Continue the simulation until ∣∣∣∣µit − µit+1∣∣∣∣ < ε.
Using the stationary distribution, µ, it is straightforward to use the goods market
condition to obtain aggregate consumption.
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